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Abstract
Previous research into the relationship between knowledge level and anchoring effects has led to mixed 
conclusions. This paper presents four studies that used a diverse set of stimuli and paradigms to further investigate 
this relationship. In Study 1, greater knowledge was associated with smaller anchoring effects—both when 
knowledge was measured using subjective self‐assessments and when using an objective knowledge measure. In 
Study 2, participants from the USA and India tended to exhibit smaller anchoring effects when answering questions 
about their own country as compared with questions about the other country. In Study 3, higher knowledge was 
associated with smaller anchoring effects when examined at an idiographic level. Finally, in Study 4, providing 
participants with information designed to increase their knowledge led to a decrease in anchoring effects. The 
consistency of the results across our four studies provides evidence that anchoring effects are moderated by 
knowledge level in many situations.
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and when using an objective knowledge measure. In Study 2, participants from the USA and India tended to exhibit smaller anchoring 
effects when answering questions about their own country as compared with questions about the other country. In Study 3, higher 
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results across our four studies provides evidence that anchoring effects are moderated by knowledge level in many situations. When people are estimating a numeric value, the introduction
of an irrelevant anchor value will often cause their estimate to
assimilate towards the anchor (for reviews, see Chapman &
Johnson, 2002; Epley, 2004; Furnham&Boo, 2011). Anchoring
effects are quite robust and have been observed in estimates
across a wide variety of domains including answers to general
knowledge questions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) and math
problems (Smith & Windschitl, 2011), estimates of real-estate
prices (Northcraft & Neale, 1987), decisions about criminal
sentences (Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006), and in the
outcomes of negotiations (Galinsky&Mussweiler, 2001). Because
anchoring effects have been observed in so many different
situations, understanding how people might overcome the
biasing influence of anchors is important. It seems plausible
that one factor that would moderate anchoring effects is a
person’s level of knowledge. That is, high-knowledge people
would be less influenced by anchors than their low-
knowledge counterparts. However, the relationship between
knowledge level and anchoring effects is unclear. Some
researchers have speculated that high knowledge people
“should” be less influenced by anchors (e.g., Mussweiler &
Strack, 1999). However, recent research suggests that high-
knowledge and low-knowledge people are equally biased by
irrelevant anchors (e.g., Englich, 2008; Englich et al., 2006;
Englich & Soder, 2009; see also Northcraft & Neale, 1987).
Given this discrepancy, the studies described in this manu-
script were designed to investigate the relationship between
knowledge and anchoring across a variety of domains.*Correspondence to: Andrew R. Smith, Appalachian State University, Departmen
E-mail: smithar3@appstate.eduBackground of Anchoring Effects and Theory
In their classic study on anchoring effects, Tversky and
Kahneman (1974) first asked participants whether the percentage
of African countries in the United Nations was higher or lower
than an ostensibly random number (predetermined to be 10%
or 65%). This anchor value influenced participants’ subsequent
estimates of the actual number of African countries in the UN
(higher estimates when the anchor was 65% rather than 10%).
Numerous accounts have been offered to explain why people
anchor on such irrelevant values in paradigms such as these.
These accounts can be grouped into three categories: (i) enhanced
accessibility of select knowledge, (ii) anchoring and insufficient
adjustment, and (iii) priming.
The first account suggests that anchors cause people to
recruit biased pools of information (Mussweiler & Strack,
1999; Strack&Mussweiler, 1997; see also Chapman& Johnson,
1999). Mussweiler and Strack’s “selective accessibility”
model explains anchoring by assuming that when participants
compare the target estimate to an anchor, they first test
whether the target is equal to the anchor value. Because people
tend to engage in hypothesis-consistent testing (Klayman &
Ha, 1987), they will likely think about information consistent
with the anchor value. When participants provide their absolute
estimate of the target value, they rely on the biased set of
information that has been recruited. Therefore, estimates
following a comparison with an anchor tend to assimilate
toward the anchor value.t of Psychology, ASU Box 32109, Boone, NC 28608-2109, USA.
The second account, “anchoring and insufficient adjustment”, 
assumes that the anchor provides a starting point that people 
use when making their judgment (Epley & Gilovich, 2001; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; see also Simmons, LeBoeuf, & 
Nelson, 2010). As information is recruited about the target, 
people adjust their estimate away from the anchor. These 
adjustments, however, tend to be insufficient (Epley & 
Gilovich, 2004). That is, people tend to stop adjusting once 
they reach a plausible estimate (Quattrone, Lawrence, Finkel, 
& Andrus, 1981). Because there is generally a large range of 
plausible estimates, adjustments that start from a low anchor 
stop at the lower end of this range, whereas adjustments from 
a high anchor terminate at the upper end of the range.
The third category of accounts, numeric and magnitude 
priming, posits that anchors prime numbers or magnitudes 
similar to the anchor value. For example, in one study, 
participants’ arbitrary ID numbers influenced their estimates 
of the number of physicians in the phonebook (Wilson, 
Houston, Etling, & Brekke, 1996). Presumably, viewing the 
ID number increased the accessibility of similar numbers. 
When participants generated their estimates, these primed 
numbers were more likely to come to mind, thereby influencing 
their estimates (see also Critcher & Gilovich, 2007; Wong & 
Kwong, 2000). The magnitude priming account is similar, but 
rather than priming numbers, it assumes that anchors prime 
magnitude concepts (e.g., “large” and “small”), and these 
concepts influence the estimates that people give (Oppenheimer, 
LeBoeuf, & Brewer, 2008).Empirical Findings Regarding Knowledge Level as a 
Moderator
As previously mentioned, a number of studies have tested for 
expertise or knowledge level as a moderating factor of anchoring 
effects, and the findings are mixed. In the next two sections, we 
review the findings suggesting the knowledge does and does not 
moderate anchoring effects.Findings Suggesting Knowledge Moderates Anchoring
Wilson et al. (1996) found that participants who reported they 
were more knowledgeable about the number of physicians in 
the phonebook were less influenced by anchors when estimating 
this value. However, participants were asked about their 
knowledge level immediately after making their estimate. 
Therefore, their knowledge judgments could have reflected their 
confidence in their estimates more so than their knowledge about 
the topic (Englich, 2008). It is also quite likely that people who 
felt they were adversely influenced by the anchor might also 
be less confident in their estimate. Therefore, it is unclear 
whether the results truly indicate that greater knowledge leads 
to smaller anchoring effects.
Mussweiler and Englich (2003) tested German participants 
on anchoring tasks before and after the introduction of the 
Euro in 2002. Before the introduction of the Euro, German 
participants showed larger anchoring effects when making 
price estimates in Euros as compared with German Marks. 
However, after the introduction of the Euro, the pattern was 
reversed. Presumably, greater experience with the Euro 
reducedthe participants’ uncertainty when making price estimates, and
their decreased uncertainty led to small anchoring effects.
In addition to the “direct” tests of knowledge and anchoring
described earlier, a study by Blankenship, Wegener, Petty,
Detweiler-Bedell, and Macy (2008) provided indirect evidence
that knowledge can mitigate anchoring effects. Participants
answered anchoring questions while either under cognitive
load or not. Participants also learned either anchor-consistent
or anchor-inconsistent information. Participants exposed to
anchor-inconsistent information exhibited smaller anchoring
effect, but only when not under cognitive load. In other words,
limiting participants’ ability to use their background knowledge
influenced the magnitude of anchoring effects.
Finally, Mussweiler and Strack (2000) conducted a study
where participants estimated the age of an ambiguous target
(“Xiang Long”) after exposure to high or low anchor. Impor-
tantly, some participants were led to believe the target was a
person, whereas others were given no such information
(i.e., the target could be a person, a national monument, or
a mountain). Participants exhibited smaller anchoring effects
when they could specify the category the target belonged to
as compared with when they lacked this information.Findings Suggesting Knowledge Does Not Moderate
Anchoring
Key studies suggesting a different conclusion come from Englich
et al. (2006). In these studies, legal experts and non-experts
made criminal sentencing decisions after reading hypothetical
scenarios. The sentence length decisions of experts and non-
experts were equally influenced by comparisons with irrelevant
anchors. In a related study, Northcraft and Neale (1987) had
real-estate agents and undergraduate students estimate the
actual price of a home after exposure to an anchor. Despite the
expertise difference between the two groups, real-estate agents
and undergraduate students exhibited similar anchoring effects.
Similar results were found in the only anchoring study we are
aware of that has manipulated participants’ knowledge level.
Englich (2008) had participants estimate the average price of a
new midsized car sold in Germany after exposure to a high or
low anchor. Before making this estimate, the participants
reviewed information that was relevant or irrelevant to their
judgments. Specifically, participants saw a series of advertisements
from which participants could learn some information about the
prices of cars (relevant knowledge) or kitchens (irrelevant
knowledge). Englich found that participants in these two
conditions were similarly affected by anchors—that is,
knowledge did not moderate anchoring effects.
Consistent with the findings described earlier, the predom-
inant opinion in the literature appears to be that knowledge
level does not moderate anchoring effects. For example, in a
recent literature review of anchoring effects, Furnham and
Boo (2011) concluded that the results of studies investigating
the influence of expertise on anchoring effects “. . .imply that
expertise does not significantly reduce the assimilative bias
in decisions that affect inexperienced laypeople” (p. 39).
Similarly, Englich and Soder (2009) stated that, “In research
to date, expertise was typically found to have little if any
influence on anchoring” (p. 48).
1Study 1 was conducted between the 2007 and 2008 National Football League 
seasons.Why Expect Knowledge as a Moderator?
Despite others’ conclusions that anchoring effects are not 
moderated by knowledge levels, we feel that the existing 
literature is inconclusive. Also, we believe there is a strong 
conceptual rationale for expecting that knowledge would 
moderate anchoring effects. There are, in fact, at least three 
reasons to expect moderation.
First, high-knowledge people might be more likely to know 
the exact answer of the target estimate. Presumably, if a person 
knows the answer, he will ignore the anchor and provide 
the known estimate. While this certainly is one way in which 
knowledge could moderate anchoring effects, the current 
studies were designed to investigate the influence of knowl-
edge on anchoring effects when people do not know the exact 
answer to the target question.
A second reason to expect knowledge to moderate anchoring 
effects is that the range of responses that people will consider 
plausible is likely to be narrower among high-knowledge people 
than low-knowledge people. When describing their selective 
accessibility model, Mussweiler and Strack (1999) speculated 
that a person’s range of plausible responses might determine 
how an anchor is processed (see also Mussweiler & Strack, 
2001). For example, a low-knowledge person who is exposed 
to an extreme anchor will likely recruit information that is 
consistent with this extreme anchor. However, a high-
knowledge person exposed to the same extreme anchor might 
not. This person would likely adjust away from the extreme 
anchor until a plausible value is reached. Then, he or she 
would recruit information consistent with this plausible value. 
Consequently, the high-knowledge person would show a 
smaller anchoring effect than the low-knowledge person.
And third, Mussweiler, Strack, and Pfeiffer (2000) demon-
strated that a way to combat anchoring effects is to consider 
anchor-inconsistent information prior to making a judgment. 
Because someone with a great deal of knowledge about a target 
has more overall information, it is more likely that he or she 
would be more likely to come up with anchor-inconsistent 
information than a person with little or no knowledge about 
the target. If this is true, we might expect anchoring effects to 
be smaller with high-knowledge people.
The prediction that increased knowledge can help limit 
anchoring effects differs from that recently expressed by other 
researchers. For example, Englich (2008) suggested that high 
knowledge may have access to more information, but because 
the anchor value affects the type of information that is recruited, 
a high-knowledge person will recruit a greater amount of biased 
information. That is, even though information that is inconsistent 
with the anchor might be available to a highly knowledgeable 
person, it is unlikely that this information will be used to form 
a judgment because anchor-consistent information is made 
most accessible by the anchor. Therefore, according to Englich, 
estimates from high-knowledge and low-knowledge people tend 
to be similarly biased by an anchor. The current studies were 
designed to test between these two competing hypotheses.
Current Studies
We conducted four studies to address the unresolved question of 
whether knowledge level moderates anchoring effects. To 
createa thorough set of tests, we sought to operationalize knowledge 
level in a variety of ways, and we used both correlational and 
experimental methods. In Study 1, we investigated anchoring 
effects in a domain (American football) with participants who 
ranged in knowledge from very low to very high. Importantly, 
we measured football knowledge using subjective self-
assessments and using an objective measure (i.e., performance 
on a football knowledge quiz). In Study 2, we had participants 
from the USA and India answer questions about US and Indian 
topics—thereby creating high-knowledge and low-knowledge 
conditions as a function of the match or mismatch between 
country and topic. In Study 3, we used a methodology that 
allowed us to assess the relationship between anchoring and 
knowledge within participants. Specifically, participants first 
indicated their level of knowledge about 14 different question 
domains. Then, they answered two anchored questions in each 
domain. Whereas the first three studies were correlational 
(or quasi-experimental), Study 4 used a fully experimental 
design in which participants were exposed to either relevant or 
irrelevant information before making an anchored estimate—a 
methodology similar to that used by Englich (2008).STUDY 1Method
Participants
The participants were 105 students enrolled in an elementary 
psychology course from the University of Iowa who received 
partial credit towards their research exposure requirement.
Anchor Questions
Because some of our participants would be very knowledgeable 
about American football, we generated target questions whose 
answers could not be directly recalled from memory (Table 1). 
For example, one question was: “What is the total number of 
points the Chicago Bears scored in all regular season games during 
the 2007 season?”1 Although high-knowledge participants 
would likely not know the exact answer, they would have useful 
knowledge that could be used to thoughtfully approximate a 
response. Consistent with the standard anchoring paradigm, a 
comparative question that introduced the anchor preceded each 
absolute question (see Table 1 for a list of anchors used).
Procedure
The participants were told that they would be answering questions 
presented in two stages; the first stage required a comparison of 
the target value with a “randomly determined” number, and the 
second stage required an estimate of the target value. After a 
practice question, participants answered the six target questions 
(always preceded by its respective comparative question) in a 










What is the total number of points the Chicago Bears
scored in all regular season games during the 2007 season?
334 85 850 127.97 (73.19) 619.32 (281.80)
What is the total weight of all the players in the starting offensive
line for the Green Bay Packers?
1814 450 4500 1,077.61 (578.30) 3,450.40 (146.42)
What is the total number of touchdown passes for all the
quarterbacks in the AFC during the first game of the 2007 season?
22 11 110 44.65 (130.40) 113.07 (77.10)
How many points did the Minnesota Vikings’ kicker score
(field goals and PATs) in the 2007 season?
99 37 370 48.57 (33.30) 261.97 (127.11)
How many yards did the Kansas City Chiefs’ punter punt for
during all regular season games in the 2007 season?
4322 720 7200 842.35 (406.73) 5,337.54 (2,367.58)
How many yards did opposing teams rush for against
the New York Giants
during all playoff games of the 2007 postseason?
296 82 820 124.56 (83.38) 671.18 (238.36)
Table 1. List of questions, answers, anchors, and means (and standard deviations) for anchored estimates in Study 1a high anchor and three with a low anchor (order counterba-
lanced across participants).
After answering the six target questions, participants 
completed three types of measures that we used to index their 
football knowledge. First, they indicated their self-perceived 
football knowledge by clicking on a continuous scale with 
four equally spaced labels (not at all, somewhat, moderately, 
and extremely). Second, on the same type of scale, they 
indicated their level of knowledge about each target question 
(e.g., “How knowledgeable are you about the total number 
of points the Chicago Bears scored in all regular season games 
during the 2007 season?”). And finally, the participants 




To examine the anchoring effects, we first dropped the responses 
(2 of 630 total estimates or < 1%) that were equal to the correct 
answer to ensure that our results were not simply due to high-
knowledge participants knowing the correct answers.2 Next, 
we standardized the participants’ estimates—separately for each 
target question (see Table 1 for unadjusted estimates). Then, we 
calculated an anchoring index for each participant by subtracting 
his/her average response for the low-anchor questions from his/
her average response for the high-anchor questions. A positive 
anchoring index indicates that the participants gave higher 
estimates after high rather than low anchors. As expected, there 
was a robust anchoring effect in the overall sample; the average 
anchoring index (M = 1.40, SD = 0.75) was significantly larger 
than zero, t(104) = 19.23, p < .001, d = 1.87.
Knowledge and Anchoring
To compute a knowledge index for the participants, we stan-
dardized the participants’ overall knowledge estimate, the 
average of their estimates of knowledge about the specific 
questions, and their quiz performance. These three measures 
were highly correlated (alpha = .92), so they were averaged
2The results of the analyses for this and the later studies were very similar 
when conducted on the full data set (i.e., not dropping accurate responses).together to create an overall knowledge index for the participants
with higher numbers indicating greater football knowledge. A
bivariate correlation between participants’ knowledge index
and anchoring index indicated a significant negative correlation,
r(105) =.56, p< .001. In other words, high-knowledge
participants tended to show smaller anchoring effects.3 It should
be noted that the participants’ anchoring index was significantly
negatively correlated with each of the three knowledge measures
(rs =.53, .59, and .44, for correlations with overall
knowledge estimate, average of knowledge on specific questions,
and quiz score, respectively; all ps< .001).
Discussion
As expected, we found that participants with higher knowledge
exhibited smaller anchoring effects. This was true regardless
of whether knowledge was assessed with self-report or with
objective measures of quiz performance. If only subjective
measures related to anchoring effect, this would be ambiguous.
It could be explained by assuming that participants’ knowledge
judgments reflected their confidence in their estimates, not their
true knowledge about the topic area. And it could even be
assumed that the magnitude of the anchoring effects influenced
how participants felt about their confidence. These interpretations
are not applicable to explaining the relation between objective
quiz performance and anchoring.
A limitation of this study is that there could be a factor
(other than knowledge) that is responsible for the decreased
anchoring effects. It is possible that people who tend to be
knowledgeable about football also tend to be resistant to judg-
mental biases for reasons other than their football knowledge.
While it is unclear what this other factor might be, Study 2 was
designed to address this limitation.STUDY 2In Study 2, we again investigated anchoring effects across high-
knowledge and low-knowledge people. Importantly, however,
we used two topic areas and two samples of people such that a3While high knowledge participants did show smaller anchoring effects, it is
worth noting that even the most knowledgeable 20% of participants showed
robust anchoring effects, t(20) = 4.16, p< .001, d= 0.91.
 
given sample would be high knowledge about one topic and
low knowledge about the other. Specifically, we recruited
participants from the USA and India who answered anchored
target questions about US topics and Indian topics. We expected
that US participants would bemore knowledgeable about the US
topics. Therefore, theywould be less influenced by anchorswhen
answering US questions than when answering Indian questions.
The opposite was expected for the Indian participants—smaller
anchoring effects with Indian questions than with US questions. 
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited from the USA (n=30, 21 women,
mean age= 35.7) and India (n=34, 15 women, mean age= 29.8)
using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and were paid $0.15
upon completion of the survey (for information on using MTurk
for participant recruitment and experimentation, see Buhrmester,
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010).Procedures and Materials
The study was advertised on MTurk and directed people to an
online survey. The participants were informed that they would
be answering questions about a wide variety of topics and that
the anchor values were uninformative. Specifically, they were
told that the numbers used were “. . .completely arbitrary and,
therefore, not informative as to the actual answer to the
question.” The participants were also given explicit instructions
about not looking up the answers to the questions.
Each participant answered eight target questions in an
individually randomized order. See Table 2 for a complete list
of the questions and the anchors that were introduced before
the respective questions. Four of the questions covered US
domains (e.g., “How many US states are west of the Mississippi
River?”) and four covered Indian domains (e.g., “How old was
Dr. Kalam when he became president of India?”).
For a given participant, high anchors were introduced before
two questions in each domain and low anchors before the other
two questions. Counterbalancing of the anchors did not affect
the results. At the end of the study, participants were asked
where they currently live and where they were born. The survey
site also recorded the geographic location of the participants.Table 2. List of questions, answers, anchors, and means (and standard
Question
On average, how long (in minutes) would it take to drive
from Los Angles to San Diego?
How many US states are west of the Mississippi River?
How many American Idol winners have there been?
In what year did the US Civil war start?
How many states in India have a population of more than 25 million pe
How old was Dr. A. P. J. Abdul Kalam when he became president of In
How many years was the Indian soap opera Kyunki Saas Bhi
Kabhi Bahu Thi on television?
What is the most number of runs scored by cricket player Mahendra








As before, we first dropped responses that were equal to the 
actual answer (29 of 512 total estimate or 5.7%). We then 
created an anchoring index within each domain by standardizing  
the participants’ estimates (see Table 2 for unstandardized 
values) and then subtracting the average of the standardized 
responses to the low-anchor questions from the average of 
the standardized responses to the high-anchor questions. 
As expected, the anchoring index was greater than 0 for 
both the US questions (M = 0.97,  SD = 1.01) and Indian
questions (M = 0.76, SD = 1.02; ts > 6.01, ps < .001). In 
other words, participants exhibited significant anchoring 
effects in both domains.
Knowledge and Anchoring
To investigate the relationship between knowledge and 
anchoring, we conducted a 2 (Question Domain: US vs. 
India)  2 (Participant Location: US vs. India) analysis of 
variance on participants’ anchoring indices. Most impor-
tantly, this analysis revealed the predicted interaction, 
F(1, 62) = 9.48, p = .003,  = .13. This interaction is depicted 
in Figure 1. Tests of simple effects revealed that the Indian 
participants exhibited significantly larger anchoring effects for 
the US questions than the Indian questions, F(1, 62) = 9.63, 
p = .003,  = .13. Although in the predicted direction, the 
anchoring effects for the US participants were not significantly 
different across the two question domains, F(1, 62) = 1.72, 
p = .20,  = .03.
Discussion
Similar to Study 1, Study 2 suggests that knowledge is 
inversely related to the size of anchoring effects. Recall that in 
Study 1, participants who were knowledgeable about football 
showed smaller anchoring effects than people who were not 
knowledgeable. This left open the alternative explanation that 
some other difference between people with high versus low 
football knowledge could account for the results. In Study 2, 
however, it was not simply the case that one group of people 
showed larger anchoring effects than another group. The key 










124 30 300 99.90 (69.87) 245.04 (127.67)
24 4 40 11.38 (8.31) 29.21 (9.81)
9 3 15 8.41 (3.62) 17.08 (13.13)
1861 1775 1925 1814.03 (100.33) 1870.63 (66.29)
ople? 14 3 25 5.11 (3.62) 18.14 (12.38)
dia? 70 48 92 54.00 (11.87) 71.04 (10.87)
9 2 16 7.50 (9.78) 12.22 (8.19)
183 110 250 150.24 (109.58) 189.78 (93.12)
Figure 1. Anchoring indices for Study 2 as a function of participant 
location and question domain. A larger anchoring index indicates a 
larger anchoring effect. Error bars represent 1 standard error
 
question domain, which essentially showed that the participants 
tended to exhibit smaller anchoring effects for questions 
from their high-knowledge domain rather than low-knowledge 
domain. This more convincingly implicates knowledge level, 
rather than some other factor, as the moderator of the 
anchoring effects.
One potential issue with this study is that, although participants 
were instructed not to, they could have looked up the answers to 
the questions. If participants selectively looked up answers to 
the questions they felt they should be knowledgeable about, we 
might see a similar pattern of results. There are, however, a 
number of reasons to doubt this occurred. First, very few 
estimates were the correct answers (<6%). Second, we observed 
the predicted pattern when we took out all correct estimates. And 
finally, if some participants looked up the answers to the 
questions, we might expect that participants who took longer 
to provide their answers (i.e., spent time searching for the correct 
answer) would be less biased. However, the amount of time 
taken did not correlate with the anchoring index for the US 
and India domains. This was true when examining all partici-
pants together (r = .12,  p = .36  and  r = .06, p = .65, respectively)
and when conducting separate analyses for participants from 
the USA (r = .01,  p = .96 and r = .11, p = .58) and India 
(r = .13, p = .45 and r = .17, p = .34).4For some questions, an answer was not readily available (e.g., “On average,
how much does a large Coach handbag cost?”). For these questions, no
responses were dropped. Additionally, data from one participant were dropped
because of apparently disingenuous responding. Ten estimates of Ichiro
Suzuki’s batting average were converted from whole numbers into percentages
(e.g., an estimate of “350” converted to “.350”).
STUDY 3In Study 3, we took an even more fine-grained approach to 
directly linking knowledge to anchoring effects. We had 
participants answer a number of anchored target questions 
across 14 different domains. Importantly, before answering 
any questions, the participants indicated their knowledge 
level in each of the 14 domains. Therefore, we were able to 
test for within-participant relationships between knowledge 
level and anchoring effects (i.e., we could do idiographic-
statistical analyses of the results).Method
Participants
Sixty-four participants (45 women, mean age = 37.8) from the
USA were recruited using MTurk and were paid $0.20 for
their participation.Procedure and Materials
After viewing initial information on MTurk, participants
were directed to the survey website. They first rated their
knowledge about 14 different domains in a random order
(see APPENDIX B for list of domains). The ratings required
the participants to compare their knowledge level with the
average person (e.g., “Compared to the average person
your age and gender, how knowledgeable are you about
baseball statistics”).
Next, the participants received instructions about the anchor
questions, were told that the anchors were arbitrarily determined,
and were given instructions not to look up any of the answers.
Each participant then answered a total of 28 anchored target
questions—two from each of the 14 domains (see APPENDIX
B for a list of the questions). The questions were presented to
the participants in a block-randomized fashion. Specifically,
the questions were distributed across seven survey pages; the
order of the pages was randomized for each participant, but the
order on each page remained constant for everyone. Each
participant answered one question within each domain after a
high anchor and one after a low anchor. This was counterba-
lanced across participants such that, for a given question,
approximately half of the participants saw a low anchor and half
saw a high anchor.Results
Anchoring Effect
We again dropped responses that were equal to the actual
answer (44 of 1764 total estimate or 2.5%).4 We then calcu-
lated anchoring indices—one for each domain for each person.
Specifically, we standardized the raw estimates separately
for each question (see APPENDIX B for unstandardized
estimates). Then, within each domain, we subtracted a partici-
pant’s standardized estimate for their low-anchor question
from their standardized estimate for their high-anchor
question. Therefore, larger values for this difference score/
index reflect larger anchoring effects. Each of the 14 domains
produced a significant anchoring effect. That is, the average
anchoring index was greater than 0 for each of the domains
(all ts≥ 2.86, ps≤ .006).
Knowledge and Anchoring Effect
To assess the relationship between knowledge and anchoring, 
we performed a mixed model analysis (as described by Judd, 
Westfall, & Kenny, 2012) testing participants’ knowledge 
indices, with the participants’ knowledge as the fixed effect 
and treating participants and question domain as random effects. 
This analysis revealed the expected effect of knowledge, 
b = .08, t(49.1) = 2.90, p = .006; anchoring effects decreased 
as participants’ reported knowledge increased. Additionally, 
the intercept for participants showed marginally significant 
variability (p = .056), suggesting that the magnitude of the 
anchoring effect varied across the participants. No other effects 
were significant. Overall, this analysis supports our prediction 
that knowledge level moderates anchoring effects.5
Discussion
Similar to the results of Studies 1 and 2, Study 3 provides 
support for the notion that higher knowledge is associated with 
smaller anchoring effects. Given that the association was 
detected using an idiographic-statistical analysis, we can rule 
out explanations for the association that might otherwise need 
to be entertained. For example, we can rule out the possibility 
that characteristics of the participants could, as third variables, 
account for the relation between knowledge and anchoring 
(e.g., that fatigue caused participants to give low estimates of 
knowledge and to be more affected by anchors).STUDY 4The first three studies shared an important limitation—namely 
the studies were all correlational or quasi-experimental. 
Therefore, our ability to draw causal conclusions is limited. To 
our knowledge, there has only been one study that has examined 
the relationship between anchoring and knowledge by manipu-
lating participants knowledge level (Englich, 2008)—a study 
that failed to find a relationship between knowledge level 
and standard anchoring effects. The target judgment in that 
study was for the participants to estimate the cost of the 
average new midsized sedan sold in Germany. At the begin-
ning of that study, some were given relevant knowledge 
(via viewing car advertisements), whereas others learned 
irrelevant information (via viewing kitchen advertisements). 
This created what Englich considered high-knowledge and 
low-knowledge participants. After reviewing the advertise-
ments, the participants were assigned to either a basic anchoring 
or standard anchoring condition. In the basic anchoring condi-
tion, the participants wrote high or low numbers numerous 
times before providing their estimate. Participants in the 
standard anchoring condition directly compared their estimate
5In addition to the mixed-model analysis, we also performed a separate regres-
sion analysis for each participant, predicting his/her anchoring index in the 14 
domains from his/her 14 knowledge judgments. We then submitted the unstan-
dardized beta coefficients from these analyses to a one-sample t-test. The aver-
age of these coefficients (M = .06, SD = .22) was significantly less than zero, 
t(62) = 2.37, p = .02, d = 0.27. Consistent with the other analysis, this indicates 
that participants exhibited smaller anchoring effects in the domains for which 
they reported higher knowledge.to a high or low anchor. Finally, participants provided their 
estimate for the target judgment about the cost of the average 
new midsized sedan.
Englich (2008) found that the knowledge manipulation did 
reduce basic anchoring effects but had no impact on anchoring 
effects resulting from standard anchoring. Englich explained 
that this difference occurred because of the different mechan-
isms thought to produce basic anchoring and standard anchor-
ing effects. Although this might be true, it should be noted 
that basic anchoring effects are notoriously fragile (Brewer & 
Chapman, 2002). Standard anchoring effects, on the other hand, 
have been described as some of the most robust in psychology 
(Chapman & Johnson, 2002). Therefore, it seems quite possible 
that a relationship between anchoring (using the standard 
anchoring paradigm) and knowledge exists, but the knowledge 
manipulation used in the study of Englich (2008) was not strong 
enough to perturb the very robust anchoring effects.
In Study 4, we used a standard anchoring paradigm that was 
generally similar to that in the study of Englich (2008), but we 
created a stronger manipulation of knowledge. We had three 
knowledge groups. One group, analogous to the kitchen condi-
tion in the study of Englich (2008), was given information that 
was not relevant to the target judgment that would be solicited 
later. A second group was given relevant information, but 
instructions introducing that information simply asked partici-
pants to read the information. A third group was given relevant 
information with much stronger instructions for learning the 
information. We expected that this latter group, relative to the 
other two groups, would be less influenced by anchors 
presented for consideration before target judgments were made.
Method
Participants and Design
One-hundred thirty-two participants (72 women, mean 
age = 34.1) from the USA were recruited using MTurk. The parti-
cipants were paid $.15 for their participation. This study was a 3 
(Knowledge Condition: irrelevant, relevant-weak, and relevant-
strong)  2 (Anchor: high vs. low) between-subjects design.
Procedure
After viewing the study information on MTurk, the participants 
were directed to the survey website, where they read some 
initial instructions. All groups were then given an opportunity 
to learn some information, but the type of information and 
accompanying instructions differed as a function of the knowl-
edge condition. In the “irrelevant” condition, participants saw a 
list of five cars, and numbers purported to be their worldwide 
sales frequencies (which are irrelevant because the later target 
judgment would be about a car price). Accompanying instruc-
tions indicated that participants should look over the list before 
moving on (see APPENDIX C for the exact instructions for all 
conditions). In the “relevant-weak” condition, participants 
saw the same instructions and the same list of cars and figures, 
except that figures were labeled as prices, which made that 
information clearly relevant for the later target judgment. In 
the “relevant-strong” condition, participants saw the same list 
of cars and prices. However, the instructions encouraged
Figure 2. Estimates given in Study 4 as a function of knowledge
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conditions. Although much smaller, participants in the relevant-





participants to carefully review the information because it 
would be useful later in the study (again, see APPENDIX C).
After reviewing the information, the participants were told 
they would be answering questions regarding their thoughts 
about new cars and that they should not look up any as we 
were interested in “. . .what you currently know, not what 
you can look up.” The participants were told they would be 
asked about randomly determined and completely arbitrary 
numbers (i.e., our anchors). Next, the participants compared 
the average price of a new midsized sedan to either a high 
($41,100) or low anchor ($14,100) (e.g., “Do you think the av-
erage price of new midsized sedan sold in the USA is more or 
less than $14,100?”). The anchor values used in this study 
were similar (after converting from Euros to US dollar) to 
those used by Englich (2008). Finally, participants provided 
an estimate of the average price of a new midsized sedan sold 
in the USA.
Results
We conducted a 3 (Knowledge Condition)  2 (Anchor) anal-
ysis of variance on participants’ estimates of the average price 
of a new midsized sedan.6 This analysis revealed a robust an-
choring effect, F(1, 126) = 60.37, p < .001,  = .32, such that 
participants who saw higher anchors gave higher average price 
estimates. More importantly, there was a significant Knowl-
edge Condition  Anchor interaction, F(2, 126) = 3.51, 
p = .03,  = .05 (Figure 2). To follow up on this interaction, 
we conducted two interaction contrasts comparing (individu-
ally) the anchoring effects in the relevant-strong condition to 
the other two conditions (Abelson & Prentice, 1997). As 
expected, participants in the relevant-strong condition were 
less influenced by anchors than participants in the irrelevant 
condition, F(1, 126) = 5.03, p = .027, and the relevant-weak 
condition, F(1, 126) = 5.67, p = .019. Tests of simple effects 
revealed robust anchoring effects for the irrelevant (p < .001,
We also examined the amount of time it took participants 
to provide their estimates. Overall, there were no differences 
between the time participants in the irrelevant (M = 23.67 seconds, 
SD = 21.84), relevant-weak (M = 25.47 seconds, SD = 11.74), 
and relevant-strong (M = 23.44 seconds, SD = 11.12) conditions 
took to give their estimates, F(2, 126) = 0.21, p = .81,   = .003.
Discussion
The results of Study 4 are consistent with the findings of the 
first three studies in that high-knowledge participants were less 
influenced by anchors than low-knowledge participants. As 
predicted, the decrease in anchoring effects occurred when 
the participants were given relevant background information, 
and they were encouraged to process this information.
In addition to supporting the claim that knowledge moderates 
anchoring effects, the results of Study 4 also potentially explain
6We did not drop any participants’ responses for being exactly accurate be-
cause no participants gave an estimate within $1000 of the average price of 
a new midsized sedan sold in the USA in 2011 (approximately $32,000).why previous investigations have failed to find this relationship
(e.g., Englich, 2008). That is, because the influence of anchors
is so robust, manipulations designed to reduce anchoring effects
must be quite strong in order to be effective. The knowledge
intervention used by Englich (i.e., presenting some participants
with advertisements about cars) was not strong enough to
overcome the anchoring effects. Similarly, in Study 4, the
participants in the relevant-weak condition exhibited virtually
identical anchoring effects as those participants in the
irrelevant condition. It was not sufficient to simply present
these participants with information that was relevant to their
later judgment. Instructions encouraging the participants to
process the information were also necessary to help reduce
the biasing influence of anchors.
An attentive reader might notice that the instructions in our
relevant-strong condition not only encouraged participants to
process the relevant information but might have also increased
the effort put forth by the participants. Therefore, it is possible
that the decrease in anchoring effects exhibited in the relevant-
strong condition was not a result of increased attention while
learning information but simply because the participants were
trying harder while providing estimates. While this is certainly
possible, we feel it is unlikely given that numerous studies
have demonstrated that manipulations designed to increase
effortful processing tend to not influence anchoring effects
from experimenter-provided anchors (e.g., Epley & Gilovich,
2005; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Wilson et al., 1996). A
recent exception to the previous research is a series of studies
described by Simmons et al. (2010). In their studies, incentives
for accuracy did increase adjustment from provided anchors
(i.e., reduce anchoring effects), but only when participants
were certain of the directions they should adjust away from
the anchor value. The concept of certainty about the direction
of adjustment of Simmons et al. (2010) is related to knowledge
level. That is, someone who is more knowledgeable will also
be better able to judge the direction he or she should adjust from
a given anchor. Although the account of Simmons et al. (2010)
does help specify when incentives for accuracy might
influence adjustment, it does not predict that high-knowledge
participants—without any incentives for accuracy—will be less
influenced by anchors than low-knowledge participants.
Therefore, it would appear that increased effort while estimating 
most likely did not produce the pattern of results observed in 
Study 4. In all likelihood, the strong instructions encouraged 
participants to pay attention to the relevant information, thereby 
increasing their knowledge about the topic area.GENERAL DISCUSSIONWe designed four studies that used a variety of methodologies 
investigating the relationship between knowledge level and 
anchoring effects. In all four studies, higher knowledge was 
associated with smaller anchoring effects. In Study 1, greater 
knowledge of football was correlated with smaller anchoring 
effects on football-related judgments. Importantly, this was 
true whether knowledge was measured using subjective self-
assessments or by using an objective measure of football 
knowledge. In Study 2, participants in India exhibited smaller 
anchoring effects for questions about India than questions 
about the USA. In Study 3, once again, higher knowledge 
was associated with smaller anchoring effects. This time, 
however, the main analyses examined the relationship within 
participant and across domains. Finally, in Study 4, manipu-
lating participants’ knowledge levels successfully reduced 
anchoring effects when the participants had been instructed 
to carefully review the provided information. The consistency 
of the results across our four studies provides evidence that there 
are many situations where anchoring effects are moderated by 
knowledge level.Figure 3. Hypothesized relationship between anchor extremity and
knowledge levelHow Does Increased Knowledge Lead to Smaller Anchoring?
Earlier, we described three ways in which increased knowl-
edge could lead to smaller anchoring effects. First, high-
knowledge participants may be more likely to have the exact 
answer to the posed questions stored in memory. While this 
would certainly mitigate anchoring effects, in the current stud-
ies, we chose questions for which very few participants knew 
the exact answers, and we only analyzed estimates when parti-
cipants did not give the correct answer. Second, high-
knowledge participants are likely to have a narrower range 
of plausible responses than their low-knowledge counterparts 
(Mussweiler & Strack, 1999). Therefore, even though their 
estimates were influenced by anchors, they were also confined 
to some degree by their narrow range of plausible responses 
(see also Mussweiler & Strack, 2000, 2001). And third, 
high-knowledge participants likely have access to more infor-
mation that is inconsistent with the anchor. Mussweiler et al.
(2000) demonstrated that considering anchor-inconsistent 
information is a way to reduce the biasing influence of 
anchors. Therefore, if a person has access to a greater amount 
of anchor-inconsistent information, he/she could use this 
information to mitigate the influence of anchors. The current 
studies were not designed to test between these explanations. 
However, now that links between knowledge level and 
anchoring effects have been established in our various 
paradigms, future research can address this issue.Will Knowledge Always Moderate Anchoring Effects?
Although the current studies demonstrate that knowledge can, 
and likely often does, moderate anchoring effects, we do not 
assume that this will always be the case. As described by 
Mussweiler and Strack (1999), it is possible that anchor 
extremity is an important variable for determining the degree 
to which knowledge will moderate anchoring effects. Imagine 
a study where a variety of anchor values that differ in their 
extremity are used. It seems possible that the difference between 
an estimate given by a high-knowledge and low-knowledge 
participant would increase as the anchor gets more extreme. 
Figure 3 plots hypothesized estimates from high-knowledge 
(solid black line) and low-knowledge (dashed gray line) 
participants after a comparison with a high (right side of the 
figure) or low anchor (left side of the figure). Notice that as 
the high anchor gets higher and the low anchor gets lower, 
the difference between high-knowledge and low-knowledge 
participants increases. Also note the decreasing slope of both 
lines. This reflects the assumption that, for example, a high 
anchor of 100 million might produce a larger anchoring effect 
than a more moderate anchor (e.g., 20 million) when estimating 
the population of Ohio. However, 100 million will produce a 
similar anchoring effect as compared with 300 million. As shown 
in Figure 3, high-knowledge participants would be expected to 
reach the plateau earlier than low-knowledge participants.
Interestingly, the hypothesized pattern of results described 
earlier could potentially account for some of the discrepant 
findings regarding the relationship between knowledge and 
anchoring effects. Namely, if a study used moderate anchors, 
the difference between anchoring effects for high-knowledge 
and low-knowledge participants might be quite small or even 
nonexistent. On the other hand, if extreme anchors are used, 
the difference between anchoring effects of high-knowledge 
and low-knowledge participants might be quite pronounced. 
In fact, two of the most widely cited anchoring studies that show 
no difference between high-knowledge and low-knowledge 
participants used moderate anchors (Englich et al., 2006; 
Northcraft & Neale, 1987). Northcraft and Neale (1987) had 
realtors and university students estimate the price of a house 
(appraised at $135,000) after comparisons with anchors 
($119,000, $129,000, $139,000, and $149,000). The estimates
following the low anchors were lower than the estimates 
following the high anchors; the magnitude of the anchoring 
effect did not differ substantially for experts and novices. 
However, it seems possible that the difference between 
experts and novices would have been evident if more extreme 
anchors were used (e.g., $89,900 and $179,900).
Similarly, Englich et al. (2006) had legal experts and non-
experts read a hypothetical scenario about a woman convicted 
of shoplifting. The experts gave recommendations about the 
length of probation the woman should receive after considering 
a high (9 months) or low (3 months) anchor. The participants 
gave higher estimates after considering a high anchor than a 
low anchor. Again, the magnitude of the anchoring effect 
did not significantly differ between experts and non-experts. 
However, if the high anchor was more extreme (e.g., 36 months), 
there might have been a different conclusion. The experts 
may have rejected this value as clearly too high and given a 
response of 10 months. The non-experts, on the other hand, 
might not know what constitutes an appropriate probation 
length and, therefore, give an estimate of 20 months.
It is also notable that the studies described in this manuscript 
used estimates with objectively correct answers (e.g., “How 
many US states are west of the Mississippi River?”). This is, 
of course, in contrast to the questions asked in the studies 
described earlier (e.g., estimating the value of a house). At this 
point, it is unknown whether the decrease in anchoring effects 
that is associated with greater knowledge is restricted to 
estimates with correct answers.
Final Thoughts
As noted earlier, there are conclusions in the published literature 
that doubt the notion that knowledge levels moderate anchoring 
effects (Englich & Soder, 2009; Furnham & Boo, 2011). Our 
work demonstrates that under fairly common conditions, knowl-
edge level can moderate anchoring effects (for similar findings, 
see Mussweiler & Strack, 2000). In addition to being an important 
conceptual clarification, this has potential implications for real-
world situations. Robust anchoring effects have been observed 
in numerous important domains such as doctors’ diagnoses 
(Brewer, Chapman, Schwartz, & Bergus, 2007), consumers’ 
willingness-to-pay for products (Ariely, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 
2003; Simonson & Drolet, 2004), and personal injury damages 
awards (Chapman & Bornstein, 1996; Marti & Wissler, 2000). 
At the same time, anchoring effects have been shown to be resis-
tant to debiasing strategies such as forewarning (e.g., Wilson 
et al., 1996) and incentives for accuracy (e.g., Epley & 
Gilovich, 2005; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; but see Simmons 
et al., 2010). Therefore, it is possible that knowledge interven-
tions, such as the one we used in Study 4, can help reduce 
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Questions Used in Football Quiz for Study 1
Question
How many games does each team play during the regular season?
How many regular season games did the New England Patriots win dur
Who was the head coach of the Chicago Bears during the 2007 season?
How many teams are in the AFC?
How many players are on the field at one time for both teams combined
What jersey number did Brett Favre wear while playing for the Green B
What player led the league with the most passing yards during the 2007
What player led the league with the most rushing yards during the 2007
What player led the league with the most sacks during the 2007 season?
What player led the league with the most interceptions during the 2007
What player led the league with the most tackles during the 2007 season
What team led the league with the most passing yards during the 2007 s
What team led the league with the most rushing yards during the 2007 s
What team gave up the fewest total yards per game during the 2007 sea
APPEND
List of Domains, Questions, Anchors, and Means (and Stand
Domains Questions
Cost of food items How much does a pound of ground beef cost
How much does a gallon of milk cost
Number of
calories in food
How many calories are in a Twinkie




What is the population of Cedar Rapids, IA
What is the population of Sioux City, IA
Number of countries
in each continent
How many countries are in South America
How many countries are in Africa
Medal counts at 2010
Winter Olympics
How many medals (gold, silver, and bronze)
did Norway win in the 2010 Winter Olympics
How many medals (gold, silver, and bronze)
did Canada win in the 2010 Winter Olympics
Baseball statistics How many home runs did Albert Pujols hit
during the 2009 MLB season
What was Ichiro Suzuki’s batting average
for the 2009 MLB seasonSmith, A. R., &Windschitl, P. D. (2011). Biased calculations: Numeric anchors in-
fluence answers tomath equations. Judgment andDecisionMaking, 6, 139–146.
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Wong, K. F. E., & Kwong, J. Y. Y. (2000). Is 7300m equal to 7.3 km? Same
semantics but different anchoring effects. Organizational Behavior and
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~$3.50 1.00 6.00 2.97 (1.06) 4.05 (1.23)
~$3.50 1.00 6.00 2.79 (0.73) 3.51 (0.76)
150 30 300 160.69 (104.20) 311.76 (157.91)
540 150 1200 570.68 (277.98) 1749.00 (2403.40)
126,326 25,000 250,000 87,882 (88,692) 214,489 (158,682)
82,684 5000 200,000 60,779 (69,995) 179,721 (146,278)
12 5 30 15.00 (6.71) 22.82 (11.93)
53 10 80 29.71 (14.17) 44.76 (21.47)
23 5 45 9.82 (7.36) 22.62 (19.13)
26 5 50 14.10 (8.44) 32.82 (19.05)
47 15 90 23.07 (14.57) 48.44 (33.01)













On average how much does a large Coach
handbag cost
~$300 50 700 237.76 (145.16) 629.12 (486.95)
On average how much does a pair of
Christian Louboutin heels cost
~$400 50 800 301.00 (195.74) 666.38 (489.64)
Albums released
by classic rock bands
How many Rolling Stones albums have
gone platinum
28 4 40 8.83 (4.58) 31.79 (20.35)
How many albums (live and studio)
has U2 released
19 4 30 14.65 (6.55) 22.10 (10.26)
Specs of cars What is the horsepower of a 2010 Mustang GT 315 75 600 205.44 (153.66) 572.59 (237.23)
What is the top speed of a 2010 Porsche
Boxster S
160 100 300 170.86 (123.74) 186.50 (43.46)
Cooking times
and temperatures
How long does it take to bake an 8 8
pan of brownies
~40 15 75 28.56 (10.67) 33.14 (11.86)
When cooking pork what is the
minimum internal
temperature that is considered safe




How many Grammy awards has Alicia Keys
been nominated for
24 3 30 6.66 (3.75) 14.79 (7.58)
How many Grammy awards has Beyonce won 16 2 25 6.18 (4.67) 10.07 (6.13)
Computers and
technology
How many gigabytes of hard drive space does
the average new desktop computer have
~500 50 1500 155.66 (172.57) 1058.25 (1341.04)
How many minutes does it take to download
a 100MB file over a DSL connection
~8 1 20 5.97 (8.06) 15.86 (18.06)
Agricultural
information
How many pounds does a large round bale
of hay weigh
1500 100 2000 269.12 (288.33) 6129 (27680)
How many bushels of corn can you get from
1 acre of farmland
180 20 400 134.83 (364.25) 533.09 (822.71)
US Civil War How many people died during the Civil War 625,000 30,000 800,000 189,706 (241,949) 695,345 (476,637)
What year did the Civil War start 1861 1825 1895 1848 (31.05) 1864 (24.96)
APPENDIX C
Instructions Used in Study 4
Irrelevant and relevant-weak conditions:
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey. You will be asked questions regarding your thoughts and feelings about a
variety of cars. To give you a frame of reference when going through this survey, we have provided you with a list of five new
cars currently sold in the US. Please take a couple minutes and review the information below. Once you have done this, click on
the Next button below.
Relevant-strong condition:
Please read carefully. Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey. This survey consists of two parts. In the first part, you
will see information about a number of cars currently sold in the US. In the second part, you will be asked questions regarding
your thoughts and feelings about a variety of cars.
Make sure to review the information below carefully as we will ask you questions about this information later. This is a short
survey, so please take your time when reviewing the information and answering questions. Please take some time now and re-
view the information below. Once you have done this, click on the Next button to proceed to the second part of the survey.
Table. (Continued)
